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Summary  findings
Klein discusses  the risks  of infrastructure  projects  and  the  of the  risk,  as with  a deductible.  In structuring
costs of capital,  rationales  for government  support  of  guarantees,  governments  need  to take  care that
private  infrastructure  ventures,  and  approaches  to  performance  incentives  for  private  investors  are not
managing  government  guarantees  of private  undermined.  Essentially,  this  means  not  covering  normal
infrastructure  investments.  Among  his recommendations:  business  risk,  including  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate
- The decision  to grant  a guarantee  for  debts  movements.
associated  with  infrastructure  projects  should  be  based  *  Governments  should  consider  sharing  normal
on an explicit  cost-benefit  analysis  for  the project  to be  business  risks only  as a last resort,  if at  all. To  prevent
guaranteed,  including  an assessment  of the likely  cost  to  excessive  government  exposure,  decisions  should  be
taxpayers  and the  impact  of alternative  forms  of  transparent  and  based  on explicit  cost-benefit  analysis.
government  support.  Monetary  limits  should  be placed  on total  government
In  principle,  when  the rationale  for  government  exposure,  and  there  should  be an exit  strategy  for the
support  arises  from  the difference  between  effective  government  wherever  possible.
willingness  to pay and  social benefits,  the  support  should  * Governments  should  consider  creating  a central
take the  form  of subsidies  supplementing  the price  office  charged  with  managing  guarantee  exposure,  to
customers  are willing  to pay for  a service.  Such subsidies  limit taxpayer  exposure  and  to strengthen  private
are contingent  on the  effective  provision  of the  performance  incentives.
subsidized  service.  They  allow  the private  provider  to be  * Governments  should  establish  a system to  update  the
guided  by the  full benefits  of the  project  without  valuation  of its guarantee  exposure  periodically  as well  as
reducing  the incencives  to perform  (as would  occur  with  mechanisms  to adjust  guarantees  or to  seize collateral
risk sharing  through  cofinancing  or guarantee).  when  fees  are not  paid.  The  use to which  guarantees  can
G  Guarantees  of policy  risks should  support  a credible  be put  should  be clearly  limited,  and policies  for
reform  program  but  not  substitute  for  it. In  the medium  appropriate  guarantee  fees and  coinsurance  requirements
termP,  policy  reform  should  obviate  the need  for  a  should  be established.
guarantee.  Beneficiaries  of guarantees  should  bear  a part
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Risks of Infrastructure  Projects  and the Cost of
Capital
Project  Risks
1.  Normal  Business  Risks. Investors  in infrastructure  projects,  for example,  power  plants,
gas pipelines,  tollroads  or water systems  are subject  to a number  of business  risks, like any other
investors. Key categories  of risk are:
*  commercial risk: construction delays and overruns, increases in  operations and
maintenance  expenses,  changes  in prices  of inputs  and outputs,  availability  and quality
of the supply,  contractor  insolvency,  etc. and
*  financial  risk:  financial market  interruption, interest rate  and  exchange rate
fluctuations.
2.  Policy Risks.  Infrastructure  projects  tend to have lengthy  construction  periods  and are
generally  long-lived,  often  spanning  several  decades. During  this long time period,  investors  have
to entrust  their fortunes  to the host community,  because  they generally  do not have the option to
take their investment  away if the business  environment  becomes  intolerable. Investors  are thus
very vulnerable  to  some form of (creeping)  expropriation  or non-performance  of contractual
parties, for  example, uncreditworthy  or unreliable  government  entities, parastatal breach of
contract,  change of law and trade regimes,  revocation  of permits, expropriation,  war, sabotage,
etc.
3.  Furthermore,  revenues from infrastructure  ventures are often denominated  in  local
currency. To the extent that foreign  investors  are involved,  they then face the risk of currency
convertibility  and transfer. Typically,  investors  ask for government  guarantees  against  these key
risks or other  related  types  of risk that may  be called  political  or policy  risks,  because  the risks are
under  the control  of government  or involve  undertakings  of a government  entity.
4.  Risk Allocation  Process. Although  simple enough  to prescribe  in general terms, the
actual risk allocation  process  through  a project's regulatory,  contractual  and financial  framework
represents  a very detailed  and complex  exercise. Factors  influencing  this process  will include:  (i)
development  status of the enabling  legal and regulatory  environment,  as well as local financial
markets; (ii)  market  structure (natural monopoly vs.  multiple potential providers); (iii)
macroeconomic  conditions; (iv) financial, technical and institutional capabilities of  the host
government  and relevant  SOEs; (v) availability  and quality  of information  required  to conduct  due
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diligence undertakings; (vi) tendering process utilized (structured vs. unstructured competitive vs.
direct assignment); and (vii) risk profile of the sector and project in question.
The  Cost of Capital
5.  The Cost of Capital in  Countries with Sound  Policies.  While infrastructure projects
are thus subject to a number of special or severe risks, they do not require government guarantees in
jurisdictions with a well-developed policy framework.  On the contrary, investors are willing to
invest at low cost of capital in countries with macro-economic stability and a regulatory regime,
which:
*  credibly allows investors to operate on a commercial basis, including a clear
path to recourse when policy problems occur; and
*  yields good infrastructure services at prices which are acceptable to consumers
and politicians.
In such countries (for example, the United States, Germany and Hong Kong) attracting investment
is comparatively easy.  Indeed, it may be a choice investment for conservative long-term investors
such as pension funds or insurance companies.
6.  Infrastructure utilities operating under a well established system of price regulation,
where price is based on cost (variants of rate-of-return regulation), tend to fund themselves at rates
of return somewhere between the real risk-free rate (treasury bill rate) of 3 to 4 per cent and the
average real return on equity of some 6 to 8 per cent (see Blanchard, 1993).  In stable economies
with more competitive solutions for infrastructure industries (telecommunications, some electricity
systems) or with price regulation which may be less cost-based (for example, price-cap regulation),
the cost of capital may be similar to that of the average real return on equity of 6 to 8 per cent (see
Alexander, 1995).1  The weighted cost of capital thus tends to range from  5 to 8 per cent in real
terms.
7.  Of  course, these  numbers should be  considered indicative  only  for  the  orders  of
magnitude of the cost of capital in stable economies with credible sectoral policies in place. They
are about the best one can hope for.  The basic message is that the cost of capital for private
infrastructure schemes does not have to be high and may well be lower than required rates of return
in other sectors that are more subject to competitive forces.  It should also be clearly understood
that exposure to competitive forces, particularly market risk will tend to raise the risk premium of
investors and, therefore, the cost of capital. Real competition will, however, tend to lead to better
service, lower cost and overall better economic performance outweighing the higher cost of capital
for an individual firm.
8.  Corporate Finance.  Most investment in private  infrastructure in  countries with  well-
established regulatory policies is funded out of internal cash generation - notwithstanding the recent
popularity of so called "project finance". For example, investor-owned  utilities in the United States
fund over 70 per cent of their new investment our of retained earnings - and often much more. New
Competition  increases  uncertainty  and  therefore  the  cost  of capital.  However,  effective  competition  tends  to lower
other  costs  by more  than  the  cost  of capital  increases.I. Risks  of Infrastructure  Projects  and  the Cost of Capital  3
share issues or debt play a minor role - as is also the case in most investments in manufacturing
companies.  To the extent that debt financing is used in these cases, it is in the form of corporate
finance, that is, lenders look for repayment to the assets and the cashflow of the whole corporation
which sponsors the project.  Interest rate spreads on corporate debt of an investment grade company
may be in the order of 15 to 225 basis points above treasuries, depending on the sector and the
exact rating.
9.  Project Finance.  However, in a number of cases, sponsors are undertaking projects
that are so large relative to their own financial size that they wish to  insulate themselves from
downside risks and/or for which they could simply not raise enough debt on the strength of their
corporate balance sheet, for example, because they have too many projects.  They may then try to
use project  finance  techniques, that is,  incorporate the project  as  a  separate, special  purpose
company and seek investors who only look to the project company for repayment, not  to  the
sponsor.  Such project finance deals have been frequent for U.S. independent power projects, 2 and
mega-projects such as Euro-tunnel and Euro-Disney.  For these projects, it has been possible to
design so-called security packages 3 for lenders without government guarantees and with minimal
undertakings, which still allow the debt to be of investment grade (BBB or above).  Euro-Disney
was able to issue 100-year bonds.  Interest spreads on investment grade project debt may start at
around 70 basis points for completed projects, and 175 basis points for projects under construction,
and can reach over 300 basis points.
10.  The Cost of Capital in Countries with High Policy Risk.  However, in many less stable
economies with  high country risk and unproven regulatory regimes, investors in  infrastructure
projects are often asking for real returns on equity in the order of 20 per cent or more and for real
returns on debt which may exceed the risk-free rate by some 3 to 5 per cent for a total real return of
at least 6 to 9 per cent, if not more. For a project with a 70 per cent debt component - an illustrative
assumption - the average cost of capital would thus be at least 12 to 13 per  cent - about double
that in stable economies with well-established regulatory regimes and may often reach 20 percent.
Many countries are so risky that investors are simply not willing to come.
11.  To make the discussion of issues here less abstract, we proceed by looking at guarantee
programs for a mythical country "Ruritania".  Ruritania's country risk is similar to that of Mexico,
Turkey or Argentina but below Colombia and Indonesia and above the Philippines and Pakistan.
While Ruritania has not issued bonds in international markets during the last two years, this risk
rating suggests that its credit might be rated below investment grade by credit rating agencies if a
rating were sought.  Assuming that Ruritania were rated similar to Mexico or Argentina, that is,
BB or BB-, the spread on foreign dollar-borrowing over US-treasuries of equivalent maturity may
be in the order of 300 to 500 basis points for sovereign borrowing and from 350 to well above 500
basis points for project debt, where projects benefit from certain guarantees such as performance
guarantees for public entities and currency transfer risk.  Equity investors claim they are seeking
real rates of return above 20 per cent for a country like Ruritania.
2  For an analysis  of risks  in independent  power  contracts  see  E. Kahn  (1991)
3  For a handbook of project finance techniques  see F. Fabozzi  and P. Nevitt, Project Financing  (6th edition),
Euromoney  Books,  1997.I. Risks of Infrastructure Projects and the Cost of Capital  4
Guarantees: Their Role, Benefits and Costs
12.  The Needfor  Government Guarantees.  It would appear unlikely that Ruritania could
raise significant amounts of medium-or long-term debt for infrastructure projects without some
government guarantees. 4 Countries that have recently raised project debt without or with very
limited government guarantees tend to be of investment grade rating, for example, Indonesia with
the Paiton power project, and Colombia with the Centragas and Transgas gas pipeline projects.
Colombia is the only country where in recent years investors in energy projects have gradually
dropped  requirements for  guarantees  of  the performance of  government purchasers.  In  the
Philippines, the developing country with most (over 30) new private power projects, investors are
still asking for government guarantees of power purchase agreements entered into by government
utilities. The Philippines has, however, obtained progressively lower power prices from investors.
13.  The Primacy of Risk Reduction.  The more the government clarifies sector policy,
withdraws from a sector and allows prices to be set at levels that cover investors' costs (including
the cost of capital), the less it will need to provide perforrnance guarantees or other types of sector
policy guarantees.  Argentina is a case in point where complete privatization of the power sector
under  an  advanced  policy  framework has  attracted  private  investors  without  the  need  for
government guarantees. The policy, including privatization, was put  in place  over a  two  year
period. The basic lesson is that the most effective way to attract investors is not to cover risks with
guarantees, but rather to reduce risks.  However, Argentina does continue to suffer from country
risk perceptions (as opposed to sector policy risks), which complicate the attraction of funds for
new investment.  Only sustained macro-economic stability will bring the desired investment grade
rating which is essential to tap the large savings of institutional investors at attractive  prices. 5
14.  Costs and Benefits of  Guarantees.  Where the cost of capital is very high or finance
difficult to attract at all, guarantees may help stimulate capital flows at reasonable rates.  However,
4  At the moment  there is no relevant infrastructure  project  experience  in Ruritania. Potential  investors  are quite
concemed about breach of contract by government entities. Despite Ruritania's liberal policy on repatriation of capital,
long-term investors are also concerned about currency convertibility and transfer risk.  Investors have purchased such
insurance from the World Bank's political risk insurance arm, MIGA.  Private insurers such as AIG have written
policies for very small amounts covering expropriation risk, wrongful calling of bonds and convertibility risk for trade
credits  in agriculture  and the manufacturing  sector.
5  Within this context it is also important to note that the worldwide market for investment grade debt (i.e., those
securities having a credit rating of BBB- or above as determined by the international rating agencies) is estimated on the
order  of $15  to 20 trillion. However,  many of these  institutional  investors  (pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  mutual
funds,  endowments)  face internal,  industry  and govemmental  restrictions  which  limit  how much  they can invest  in sub-
investment  grade securities  to less  than 3 to 5% of their portfolios  - of which  only 1%  is allocated  to debt instruments.
This 1% is then spread  across  three asset classes:  corporate  bonds traded  in the Euromarket,  local currency  sovereign
debt,  and Brady  bonds. In 1994,  for example,  institutional  investors  held only  $126 billion  of emerging  market  debt.
Moreover,  given that  project  financings  entail  all risks associated  with  a sovereign  and corporate  issuance  (political  and
macroeconomic  instability,  foreign  exchange),  as well as additional  commercial  risks (construction,  operation  and
maintenance,  force  majeure)  all-in funding  costs  for these  securities  should  be in excess  of those offered  for sovereign
issuances  of similar  size and maturity.  This is often referred to as the "sovereign  ceiling affect".  Only special
guarantees  from parties  with  higher  credit  rating  than the sovereign  (e.g., the World  Bank) could  allow project  debt to
break through  the sovereign  ceiling.I.  Risks of Infrastructure Projects and the Cost of Capital  5
the provision of guarantees may reduce government's overall ability to borrow and entails direct
costs in case a guarantee is called.  One can estimate the fiscal impact of guarantees.  In practice,
such estimates tend to be broad approximations due to lack of all the necessary information to
calculate exact equivalents. Nevertheless, the estimated cost of support can then be considered in a
cost-benefit analysis of the project. The question is whether the undeniable benefits of guarantees
are worth their cost and whether they are the most efficient instrument of government support.
Recommendation (1): The decision to grant a guarantee should be based on an
explicit cost-benefit analysis for the project  to be  guaranteed, including  an
assessment of the likely cost to taxpayers and the impact of alternative forms of
government support.II
Rationales  for Government  Support  of Private
Infrastructure  Ventures
Govemment  Support  for Projects
1.  Types of Support.  Whenever  projects require Government  support to attract private
investors,  there are several  ways to provide  such  support. It may take the form of a guarantee  or a
cash subsidy.  Alternatively,  the Government  can invest debt or equity alongside the private
investors. Finally,  the government  may provide  complementary  investments,  for example,  a feeder
road leading to  a  private port project.  The following discussion compares three types of
government  support: guarantees,  cash subsidies  and financial  investment  (debt or equity). The
case of complementary  investments  or undertakings  may be thought of simply as an in-kind
subsidy,  such  that the arguments  about  cash subsidies  apply.
2.  In practice,  private debt and/or equity investors  may ask for a mix of government
support  encompassing  some  or all of the types  of support  mentioned  above. For example,  a private
investors  in a tollroad  may ask the govermment  to provide:  i) a guarantee  to maintain  agreed  tariff
policy as well as currency  convertibility;  ii) a guarantee  of refinance  to lengthen  credit  maturity;
and iii) subordinated  debt to reduce  the need for senior  debt, while  maintaining  the profitability  of
equity. Arguments  are often made that the project  provides  special social benefits  justifying  the
support  and that investors  need  protection  against  capricious  policy  changes. Often  there are good
reasons to provide support and private finance may not be forthcoming  in sufficient amounts
without  it.  However,  to assess,  which type of support  is most appropriate  from the government's
(and society's) point of view, it is necessary  to explore the possible rationales  for government
assistance.
3.  Analysis  of  Differing  Forms  of  Project Support.  Any  assessment of  the
appropriateness  of government support involves the following steps.  First, the rationale for
government  support  should  be established.  Second, the possible  appropriate  instrument  of support
needs to be determined. Third, the incentive  effects of each support measure - how it affects
demand  and costs -should  be assessed.  Finally,  for each  of these  instruments  the net present  cost to
government  can be calculated  and compared  to likely  benefits. Then the decision about the forn
and terns of government  support  may  be made.
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4.  A  Hypothetical Exampla  The following discussion is based on a sample "project",
which might be a tollroad, a power plant or a water distribution system. In the discussion it will be
assumed that we  are dealing with  a tollroad.  Table 1 lays out the "base case".  To make the
example relatively easy to follow some simplifying assumptions are made, which do, however, not
change the basic arguments:
*  all calculations are in real tenns, that is, inflation is not considered;
*  there are no taxes;
*  there is no net depreciation, that is, maintenance contained in current costs
restores the value of assets in each period of the project and the project lasts
forever. Initial investment is thus equal to total assets in all later periods;
*  net  debt  service  paid  in  each period  encompasses only  interest  and  that
principal is continuously rolled over;
*  under these assumptions the annual return to (debt or equity) investors (R)
divided by the amount of original investment (I) is equal to the internal rate of
return for the investor (r):
R
I
*  a key identity used in the calculations is:
Return on total assets (ROA) equals return on equity (ROE) times share of
equity (e) in total assets plus return on debt (ROD) times share of debt in
total assets (d):
ROA = ROE*e+ROD*d
This is the standard formula for the calculation of the weighted average cost
of capital of a project or a firm; and
*  the original investment is assumed to be 100 (units whatever relevant currency).
5.  In this tollroad example, it is assumned  that the project is fully financible from private
sources with a debt - equity (or gearing) ratio (d:e) of 75:256  and a return on assets of 10.5 per cent.
This translates into an interest rate of 8 per cent for providers of debt, expected with  certainty.
Equity investors would obtain a rate of return of 18 per cent at this gearing ratio.  To simplify the
exposition, it is assumed that the rates of return for debt and equity investors are equal to the
required rates and that capital structure (i.e. the gearing ratio) does affect the cost of capital (i.e. the
6  This is a typical gearing ratio for many project financings.II. Rationales  for Government Support of Private Infrastructure Ventures  8
required return on assets of 10.5 per cent).  This will not be so in reality, where a change in gearing
will affect the riskiness of debt and equity and may not change the weighted average cost of capital
by much. In the discussion, it will be pointed out how this assumption affects the nature of results.
TABLE 1: Base Case
Price  4  4  4
Quantity  5  2.5  3.75
Revenue  20  10  15
Current  Costs  5  5  5
Cash  Flow  15  5  10
Return  on Assets  (100)  15%  5%  10%
Private  Debt Service  6  5  5.5
Private  Equity  remuneration  9  4.5
Share of Private  Debt  75%  75%  75%
Share  of Private  Equity  25%  25%  25%
Share  of Government  Subordinated  Debt
Share  of Govemment  Equity
Return on Private  Debt  8%  6.7%  7.3%
Return  on Private  Equity  36%  0  18%
Return  on Government  Subordinated 
Debt
Retum on Government Equity
6.  In the "base case" it is assumed that the tollroad charges a toll of 4 per vehicle. Demand
(usage of the road) is uncertain and may amount to 5 vehicles per period or to 2.5 (e.g. two cars and
a motorbike) per period with equal probability of 0.5 each. Current costs are assumed to amount to
5 yielding potential cashflows of 15 or 5 and an expected (probability weighted) cashflow of 10.
The cost of the road is 100 and it is to be financed with 75 per cent debt and 25 per cent equity. As
can be seen from table 1 equity investors can expect a return of 18 per cent, whereas debt investors
face an expected return of 7.3 per cent, below the required rate of 8 per cent. Without some form of
government support the project will not be financible as planned.
Basic  Rationales  for Government  Support
7.  In  the  following, variations of  the base  case will be  used  to  illustrate  the major
arguments about government support. We start with a review of the basic rationales for support. In
principle, there can be three basic reasons for providing government support to private projects:
*  the social benefits of the project may exceed private benefits (or  effective
private willingness to pay);II  Rationales  for  Government  Support of Private Infrastncture  Ventures  9
*  investors may require protection against political risks, which the government
controls; and
*  the  government  may  take the  view  that  risk  premia  required  by  private
investors are higher than those required by government itself, that is, by the
taxpayers.
8.  Case I:  Social Benefits Exceed Private Benefits.  Consider now the cases where social
benefits exceed private benefits. There are several sub-cases. First, private willingness-to-pay may
be less than social benefits due to a type of benefit generated by the project, which does not accrue
to the consumers, who can be charged.  For example, if the introduction of safe drinking water
reduces the danger of infection to people, who are not customers of the water system, it may be
worth subsidizing a water project.  Second, a project may benefit consumers whom the government
wants to subsidize for reasons of equity.  Third, in the case of natural monopolies, where variable
cost of a service is lower than average cost, optimal utilization of the service may require a subsidy.
For example, in the case of an uncongested toll road, the variable cost of using the road is minimal
and consequently the toll should be low, so that the road is fully used.  However, the total cost of
the road cannot be recovered from such low tolls.  Ideally, road users would be charged an access
fee for the road, which covers the fixed costs.  But this may not be feasible and a subsidy could be
considered instead.
9.  Table 2 illustrates a case where private willingness-to-pay is 2, but a price of 3.1 is
required to render the road financible. In this case, we disregard uncertainty and focus only on the
difference  between private and social benefits. Assuming that social benefits exceed 3.1 the project
should be undertaken, but drivers are only willing to pay a toll of 2.  To attract private finance, the
government may then provide a subsidy of 1.1 per vehicle passing the road.  Alternatively, it could
let the tollroad operator charge a toll of 2 and provide a subsidy for construction of 37.5, which
could also  be  declared  "subordinated equity" with  some rights  to  returns  should the  project
unexpectedly yield greater benefits, although this would change the character of normal equity and
transform it into subordinated debt.
10.  The opportunity cost of the upfront subsidy of 37.5 is equal to an annual payment of 5.5
if the government could alternatively invest 25 as equity with an expected return of 18 per cent and
12.5 as debt with an expected return of 8 per cent.  5.5 is also the annual payment needed to pay a
subsidy of 1.1 per vehicle.  Therefore, as long as the opportunity cost of government investment is
evaluated at rates equal to returns required by private investors there is no difference in the net
present cost of the two forms of subsidy.
11.  However, the exposure to risk differs in the two cases.  In the first case the government
is not  exposed to construction, operating and traffic risk.  If the road is not built within  cost
estimates or not operated well or does not attract traffic the government does not pay.  In the second
case it will definitively pay.  When the costs are considered equal we obtain:If. Rationalesfor  Government  Support  of Private  Infrastructure  Ventures  10
TABLE  2:  Social  Benefits  Exceed  Private  Benefits
Price  3.1  2
Quantity  5  5
Revenue  15.5  10
Current Costs  5  5
Cash Flow  10.5  5
Debt Service  6  5.0
Equity remuneration  4.5
Share of Private Debt  75%  62.5%
Share of Private Equity  25%
Share of Government
Subordinated Debt
Share of Govermnent Equity  37.5
Return on Private Debt  8%  8%
Return on Private Equity  18%
Return on Government
Subordinated Debt
Return  on  Govermment  Equity  0
Recommendation (2):  In principle, when the rationale for government support
arises from the  difference between effective private willingness to  pay  and
social benefits it should take the form of subsidies supplementing the price
customers are willing to pay for a service. Such subsidies are contingent on the
effective provision of the subsidized service. They allow the private provider to
be  guided by the full benefits of the project without lowering incentives to
perform as would be the case under some form of risk-sharing via co-financing
or guarantee.
12.  Case II: Policy Risk.  The second major reason for government support is that only the
government is be able to cover some risks, such as currency transfer and breach of contract by
government entities, for example, parastatals or municipalities. In this case the government could,
of course, reduce risks by introducing appropriate reforms.  Table 3 illustrates this case, which
presumes that there is a risk that the public toll road authority that supervises the private tollroad
concession may not honor its commitment to allow tolls to be set at 3.1.  (Here it is assumed that
drivers are willing to pay 3.1.)  Instead, investors fear that under political pressure tolls may be
dropped to 2. The central government can then provide a guarantee that this will not happen.  In the
"pure" case when the central government has effective control over the tollroad authority it can
ensure that the tolls will not be dropped and issue the guarantee confident that it will never be
called. The existence of the guarantee then renders the tollroad concession credible at zero cost to
the government.  A price of 3.1 remains sufficient to provide investors with their required returns.
This is simply the case of a country where contracts and rules are respected.IH. Rationales  for Government Support of Private Infrastructure Ventures  11
TABLE  3: Pure Case  of Policy  Guarantee  with  Zero Social  Cost
:-  <  - g  - M ¢  S  ossIbIe  --  cm  Posble Outoe  Expecte
4¢  ;-  l~~~~Prbailt  1)  (PobbIit  -°  ;)Otcm
Price  3.1  2  3.1
Quantity  5  5  5
Revenue  15.5  10  15.5
Current Costs  5  5  5
Cash Flow  10.5  5  10.5
Debt Service  6  6  6
Equity Remuneration  4.5  4.5
Share of Private Debt  75%  75%  75%
Share of Private Equity  25%  25%  25%
Share of Government Subordinated Debt
Share of Government Equity
Return on Private Debt  8%  8%  8%
Return on Private Equity  18%  0  18%
Return on Government Subordinated
Debt
Return on Government Equity
Government Guarantee Payment  0  5.5  0
13.  Table 4 illustrates a case where the government has limited control over the tollroad
authority and the political pressures that may lower the toll to 2.  It is assumed that there is a 0.5
probability for the latter case.  Now the guarantee has a 50 per cent chance of being called and
therefore a cost.  If the government wants to  charge a fee for the guarantee, which  equals its
expected value then tolls have to be raised to 4.2 in the example.  Consumers would thus pay for
the risk imposed by the tollroad authority and political pressures in case the tolls remain as planned.
Otherwise they would benefit from lower prices.  Their expected price remains 3.1.  Alternatively,
the government could impose the cost on the taxpayer, for example, by not charging a guarantee
fee. In that case consumers would expect to be better off when there is a chance of toll road
authority reneging on its tariff commitments, while taxpayers would be worse off.
14.  Moral Hazard  and Adverse  Selection.  Risks  such as  that  of reneging  on  tariff
undertakings tend to arise from a lack of commitment on the part of the insured entity (one may call
this  "political  risks",  when  those  entities are  in  the  public  sector).  Insuring  against  such
misbehavior can create the temptation for the misbehaving party not  to improve behavior but
instead to sin even more (moral hazard). In other words, the existence of insurance will change the
probability of reneging to more than 50 per cent.  Full insurance against such risk will also tempt
investors to  seek out projects with  excessive risk (adverse selection). Therefore, the insurance
should not cover the risk fully, but leave beneficiaries somewhat exposed, like any "deductible" in
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TABLE 4: Government Guarantee not "Risk Free"
Price  4.2  2  3.1
Quantity  5  5  5
Revenue  21  10  15.5
Current Costs  5  5  5
Cash Flow  16  5  10.5
Debt Service  6  6  6
Equity Remuneration  4.5  4.5  4.5
Share of Private Debt  75%  75%  75%
Share of Private Equity  25%  25%  25%
Share of Govermnent Subordinated Debt  -
Share of Government Equity
Return on Private Debt  8%  8%  8%
Return on Private Equity  18%  18%  18%
Retum on Government Subordinated
Debt
Return on Government Equity
Government Guarantee Payment  5.5  2.75
Guarantee Fee  5.5  __2.75
15.  The Nature of Political Risk.  A small degree of political risk is normal and should be
accepted  by market  participants.  For example,  under  well-established  regulatory  regimes  investors
and  consumers  bear  political  risk  as  a matter  of course.  Regulators  and  governments  anywhere
have  the unavoidable  authority  to adjust rules and regulations  in ways  that affect  the property  rights
of players  in the market.  Often times,  such powers  to affect property  rights and  values are coupled
with  an  obligation  of the  regulatory  authority  to  see  to  it  that  the  affected  party  receives  just
compensation  or  that  its  "equilibre  financier"  be  maintained.  However,  in  many  cases,
governments  have  the right  and in deed the duty to change  regulations  in such a way that  behavior
of market  participants  is changed.  That may require  affecting their property  rights  - and  thus their
net worth,  which  is based  on the expected stream of future cashflow  - without  full compensation.
16.  More  severe  political  risks  will  not  be  accepted  by  investors  and  are  generally  not
insurable  in  private  markets,  because  the  guarantee  is  likely  to  be  called  and  its  existence  may
actually  increase  risk  on account  of moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection.  While  governments  may
be  able  to  provide  guarantees  due  to  their  taxation  powers,  it is  only  desirable  to  do  so  if  the
guarantee  supports  serious efforts to deal with the source of the risk.7
7  The same reasoning applies to straight govemment loans to projects and provides the case for conditionality under
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17.  Separating Political from  Commercial Risk  In practice, it is often difficult to write
guarantees  that  neatly  separate commercial from political  risk.  For  example, the  sovereign
government may want to guarantee performance of a power company under the power purchasing
agreement with a private power plant. Non-performance may take the form of non-payment due to
inadequate final user tariffs, a form of policy risk.  Alternatively, it may be due to mismanagement
by the power company, a commercial risk. In both cases the credit-worthiness of the off-taker is in
doubt and with it its ability to perform under the contract. The construction phase of a project may
also be plagued by a mix of technical and policy risks, such as the risk of obtaining construction
permits, environmental clearances, import licenses, rights-of-way, etc.
18.  While perfect separation of political and commercial risk is difficult, there are clearly a
number of risks such as (much of)  construction risk as well as operating, price and demand risk
including movements in exchange and interest rates that do not require taxpayer support.  These
risks can be split between investors and consumers depending on who is better able to manage,
diversify, hedge or bear the risk in question. For example, if investors have access to the foreign
exchange  swap  market  they  should probably bear the  risk  of  foreign  exchange movements.
However, when there are no such hedges available, it may be legitimate to pass all sorts of price
risks to  consumers, for example, via tariff escalation clauses.  If  the resulting prices exceed
consumers' willingness to pay, the project should not be undertaken, unless there is reason to
subsidize it.  Clearly,  government need not  insure risks,  for  which  private  markets provide
coverage.
19.  What risks may legitimately be guaranteed by the government is thus a matter of some
debate and unavoidable judgment.  It needs to reflect particular country and project situations.
Generally  accepted  and  relatively  well  defined  is  insurance  against  war  and  insurrection,
expropriation (including creeping expropriation) and impairment of currency transfer, a form of
(partial) expropriation. 8 Matters  become  fuzzier when  performance of  government  or  sub-
sovereign entities in line with certain undertakings is concerned, for example, a power purchase
agreement, a promise to provide complementary infrastructure (e.g. a road to a project), provision
of permits for construction, import, operations, etc. It becomes more and more difficult to tell apart
the proper exercise of discretion by some authority and improper interference. For some projects it
may be inevitable that a guarantee cover some normal business risks alongside policy risks.  But
this may still be preferable to full credit guarantees.
Recommendation (3): Guarantees of "policy" risks should support a credible
reform program but not substitute for it.  In the medium-term policy reform
should obviate the need for a guarantee. Beneficiaries of guarantees should bear
a part of the risk, like a deductible.  In structuring guarantees the government
needs  to take  care that performance incentives for private investors are not
undermined,  essentially by  not  covering  "normal business risk,"  including
exchange rate and interest rate movements.
Private insurers provide coverage against these risks for limited time periods, maximum seven years and generally
only for strongly collateralized transactions such as international trade credit and finance for mobile assets such as
airplanes.  Government-backed entities such as  OPIC and  MIGA provide coverage against such risks  for longer
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20.  Case III: The Cost of Risk-bearing of Taxpayers is Lower than that of Investors.  The
third major reason for government support derives from the view that government has a lower cost
of risk-bearing than the private sector, because it can spread risk in  tiny amounts over many
taxpayers (see Arrow and Lind, 1970).9  The problem is that it is never quite clear what  the
incidence on taxpayers is and,  therefore, their cost of  risk-bearing.  The danger remains that
taxpayers may be exploited, although there may be benefits from risk-sharing to the extent that
taxpayers are more tolerant of risk than other investors (see Box 2).10
21.  Tables 5 and 6 provide examples where government subordinated debt renders projects
financible. In these cases we are back to the base case assuming that there is a 50 per cent chance
each that traffic levels are at 5 or 2.5 vehicles respectively. The provision of subordinated debt can
result in maintaining required returns to the private investors, while providing government with
returns, which may well exceed the government borrowing rate.  (Note that the cases in table 5 and
6 are constructed such that the required return for debt and equity are first provided for and the
remaining  cashflow  goes  to  govermment for remuneration of  its  subordinated debt.  In  the
examples, this is equivalent to assuming that private equity investors are limited to a maximum rate
of return of 36 per cent - a simplification for expositional purposes, which simply illustrates the
room for remuneration of subordinated debt.)  Increases in the amount of subordinated debt can
improve the  expected rate of return on such debt, obviously until all  finance is provided by
government and the expected  return  is 10 per cent.
TABLE  5: Government  Shares  Risk by Subordinating  Debt (1)
Price  4  4  4
Quantity  5  2.75  3.75
Revenue  20  10  15
Current Costs  5  5  5
Cash Flow  15  5  10
Debt Service  2  2  2
Equity Remuneration  9  0  4.5
Share of Private Debt  25%  25%  25%
Share of Private Equity  25%  25%  25%
Share of Government Subordinated Debt  50%  50%  50%
Share of Government Equity
Return on Private Debt  8%  8%  8%
Return on Private Equity  36%  0  18%
Debt Service for Government  4  3  3.5
Subordinated Debt
Return on Government Subordinated  8%  6%  7%
Debt
Return on Government Equity  ___  __
9  Another reason for government support may be that the government is better informed about certain risks than
private parties.  But if it were, it could pass the information to the private sector rather than providing insurance.
10  While the rationale for this type of risk-sharing  is weak, it de facto receives a lot of attention.II  Rationales  for Government  Support  of Private  Infrastructure  Ventures  15
22.  Tables 7 and 8 provide examples where the government provides equity or debt pari
passu with private debt or equity investors, and the retums of equity investors will be diluted.  Such
dilution may render projects unfinancible.  However, to the extent that the required returns on
private debt and equity fall as gearing ratios change this may not happen.  The provision of pari
passu finance can then render projects financible, however, only if the government accepts higher
risks than the private sector for equal remuneration.  Recall also the example of table 2, where an
upfront subsidy was normally inferior to price subsidies.  But when governments expect lower
returns than private parties it could be that an upfront subsidy is justified.
23.  In all cases, whether government finance is subordinated or not, it will render projects
financible if and only if the government is willing to accept risk-adjusted returns that are below
those of the private sector.  As mentioned above, this can only be justified  if one assumes that
taxpayers do not require a risk premium for the risks they assume that is  comparable to  that
required by private investors.  While it is clear that taxpayers can to some extent be forced to
accept low risk premia, it is less clear whether this is desirable.
TABLE  6: Government  Share  Risk by Subordinating  Debt (2)
- - . . f b  R  PGssibIe  Oukoze  :  -iPiiDible  Outcne  E  - . .4
Price  4  4  4
Quantity  5  2.5  3.75
Revenue  20  10  15
Current Costs  5  5  5
Cash Flow  15  5  10
Private Debt Service  0.8  0.8  0.8
Private Equity Remuneration  3.6  0  1.8
Share of Private Debt  10%  10%  10%
Share of Private Equity  10%  10%  10%
Share of Govermnent Subordinated Debt  80%  80%  80%
Share of Government Equity
Return on Private Debt  8%  8%  8%
Return on Private Equity  36%  0%  18%
10.6  1.2  7.4
Return on Government Subordinated  13.25  5.25  9.25
Debt
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TABLE  7: Government  Shares  Risk  Pari  Passu  in Debt
Price  4  4  4
Quantity  5  2.5  3.25
Revenue  20  10  15
Current Costs  5  5  5
Cash Flow  15  5  10
Debt Service  5  5  5
Equity Remuneration  10  0  5
Share of Private Debt  31.25  31.25  31.25
Share of Private Equity  37.5  37.5  37.5
Share of Government Debt  31.25  31.25  31.25
Share of Government Equity
Return on Private Debt  8%  8%  8%
Return on Private Equity  26.7%  0%  13.35%
Return on Government Debt  8%  8%  8%
Return on Government Equity  ___  __
TABLE  8: Government  Shares  Risk  Pari  Passu  in Equity
Price  4  4  4
Quantity  5  2.5  3.75
Revenue  20  10  15
Current Costs  5  5  5
Cash Flow  15  5  10
Private Debt Service  5  5  5
Private Equity Remuneration  5  0  2.5
Max. Share of Private Debt  62.5%  62.5%  62.5%
Share of Private Equity  18.75%  18.75%  18.75%
Share of Government Subordinated Debt
Share of Government Equity  18.75%  18.75%  18.75%
Return on Private Debt  8%  8  -8
Return on Private Equity  26.7%  0  13.35
Government Equity Remuneration  5  0  25
Return on Government Subordinated
Debt
Return on Govermnment  Equity  26.7%  0%  13.35%II.  Rationales  for Government Support of Private Infrastructure Ventures  17
Key Trade-Offs in Assessing Costs and Benefits  of Government Support
24.  In general, the issue is to structure government support of project financing so as to:
*  provide investors with a level of comfort needed to induce desirable investment;
*  expose the taxpayer  to  the least possible risk  (lowest risk-adjusted subsidy
equivalent); and
*  preserve incentives for private infrastructure  providers to perform efficiently.
The  trade-off between  these  considerations can only  be  quantified if  one  makes  an  explicit
assumption about the risk premium (see Box 2) that taxpayers would require to assume the relevant
project risks.
Incentive Issues
25.  Risk-Sharing and the Power of Incentives.  The potentially relatively low cost of risk-
bearing  of  taxpayers provides the basic  theoretical rationale for  government support through
sharing non-political risks. To structure the best possible support, one would still need to consider
how the various forms of support affect risk-sharing and, therefore, incentives, for example."
*  Cash subsidies that are dependent on project success provide very high-powered
incentives for private investors to perform, because all variations in cashflow are
borne by the project. However, cash subsidies that are unconditionally provided
upfront weaken incentives to  invest and  operate efficiently.  They are like
"subordinated equity" without any right to an upside reward.
*  With normal equity contributions government shares in future losses or gains.  It
thus makes investment by risk averse investors more likely, but by the same
token lowers incentives to investors because the government shares some risks.
*  With loans government shares downside risks without upside potential.  Loans
can be very effective in attracting equity investors into projects but they may
also provide low-powered incentives to deal with the risks that are covered,
because beneficiaries are protected from downside risk and  thus tempted to
misbehave (moral hazard) and pursue risky projects (adverse selection).
26.  In principle, guarantees allow the government to achieve these goals in the best possible
way by allocating risks to the parties that can best bear them.  In other words, guarantees enable the
government to  provide conditional rather than only  unconditional support.  Depending on the
project, the sector, the creditworthiness of the parties involved in a project and the track-record of
the government itself, project support should ideally be structured differently.
27.  Transaction Costs.  Such flexibility also has costs.  Non-standard forms of support,
including non-standard guarantees may raise the costs of negotiation.  Therefore, the ideal risk-
sharing arrangement may not be  worth defining and some simpler solution may be preferable.
However, because governments may want to phase out guarantees for private investors over time,
I  IGovernment  risk-sharing  may, of course, also be achieved through adjustments of the tax system.II. Rationales  for Government  Support  of Private  Infrastructure  Ventures  18
they may not have the option to standardize guarantees much or run the risk of providing excessive
guarantees.
28.  Moral Hazard on the Government Side.  Flexibility given to government officials may
be abused. After all they decide on the use of tax money rather than their own.  Therefore, the ideal
risk-sharing arrangements may also not be desirable.  For example, an equity contribution may be
desirable in  a project because it provides adequate risk-sharing.  But because it is difficult to
ascertain whether government as an equity investor is receiving adequate remuneration, it may be
preferable to  maintain govermment  claims senior to  equity, that is, at least in the form of  sub-
ordinated debt, because then equity investors - if there are significant ones - are exposed prior to the
taxpayer.  If there is a risk that government subordinated debt may be underpriced and also abused,
for example, because equity exposure is small, then senior straight debt may be preferable.
Recommendation  (4):  Government risk-sharing  in  normal  business  risks
should only be  considered as  a  last resort, if  at all.  To  prevent excessive
government exposure, decisions should be  transparent and based on  explicit
cost-benefit  analysis.  Certain  forms  of  support  that  severely  expose  the
taxpayer, for example, equity investment by the government should either be
prohibited or subject to various principles (for example, "buy no more than 25
per cent of the equity";  "require minimum capital at risk of 40 per cent of total
assets").  Monetary limits should be  placed  on total  government exposure.
Tlhere  should be an exit strategy for the government, wherever possible.III
Managing  Guarantees
Allocating  Responsibility  for  Guarantee  Decisions
1.  The Need for  Discretion  and Arms-Length  Relationships. Guarantees  have to be
consciously structured so as to  minimize government  exposure and enhance policy reform.
Judgment  is unavoidable  - both in regard to the detail of coverage  to be provided and to the
credibility  of accompanying  reforms. Therefore,  those who decide on guarantees  should be at
arms-length  from  the authorities  and investors  that are  promoting  the project  in question.
2.  Consistency. To obtain consistency  in the provision of guarantees  and to develop
judgment,  it may be desirable  to form a central  guarantee  authority. The measure  of the guarantee
authority's  success  must be total investment  attracted  relative  to the amount  of guarantees  issued  -
not the total value of guarantees  issued. Of course,  projects  need to be of good quality and sound
government  liability  management  should  be in place.
3.  Attracting High Quality Staff and Learning.  Countries  such as Pakistan and the
Philippines  that have pursued several  private  infrastructure  projects  have come to see the value in
establishing  an agency  which can learn and transfer  lessons  from one project  to the next and across
sectors  - greatly  reducing  transaction  costs in the process. Because  the required  expertise  is often
difficult to attract for civil servant salaries, it may be of interest to establish  it as a somewhat
autonomous agency outside the  career civil  service. Establishing such an  agency allows
concentration  of expertise.
4.  Guarantee  Corporations. If the government  envisages  support  for a large number  of
deals, it may  be useful  to establish  a special  corporation  funded  by the government.  This makes it
feasible to  establish a  visible limit on total government  exposure by  placing a  ceiling on
government financial exposure in  the corporation  via  equity contributions  or limits for the
corporation's  borrowing.  The agency  may  be authorized  to attract  private  equity  and debt  investors
to help leverage  the government's  resources. It thus starts resembling  a "government-sponsored
enterprise"  in the United  States  (Fannie  Mae,  Freddie  Mac etc.).
Recommendation  (5): Government  should  consider  creating a central  office,
which is  charged with structuring guarantees so as to  minimize taxpayer
exposure and to strengthen  private performance  incentives. Such an agency
should  be established  at arms-length  from project promoters  both within and
outside the government.  Government  should  clearly  circumscribe  the types of
guarantee  coverages  that such an agency  may offer. If the government  wanted
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to  pursue  a  significant pipeline of  private  infrastructure projects  it  should
seriously  consider  establishing a  guarantee corporation, which  would  help
develop  standardized guarantee products,  facilitate learning  across  projects,
reduce  the need  for state  and municipalities to  issue guarantees, allow the
employment of  competent staff to  do  so and  limit taxpayer  exposure in  a
relatively transparent way.
Valuation  of Government  Support  Including  Guarantees
5.  Regardless of which institution(s) manage(s) the government's support program for
infrastructure, it will be  important to  establish valuation principles that  allow government  to
understand and manage its exposure.  Guarantees, in particular, tend to be difficult to value.  Most
countries  do  not  show  guarantees  on  their books  and  do  not  estimate  their  impact  on  the
government's fiscal position.  Only recently, starting with the United States 1991 Credit Reform
Act have selected OECD countries started to assess the fiscal impact of guarantees.  There are,
however, a number of govermments,  which try to value the interest rate subsidy or default risk in
some of their loans (Germany, Canada, Switzerland,  New Zealand).
BO:X  I-. Goenmn  gu.-te  in OECD  ;  countries
6.  The issue is simple.  Full credit guarantees may expose the govegrment to the same
risks as loans.  But they affect the cash position of the govegrment differently. Firstly, guarantees
produce cash inflows (gaarantee fee) and only later, if the guarantee is called, expenses and with
them an increase in the goverment's  gross borrowing requirement. A loan bearing the same risks,
first produces  a cash  outflow, which increases the goveno  menD?  s  gross borrowing requirement.
Only later does the goves,nent  obtain cash inflows from interest payments.  Governm  ents have111.  Managing Guarantees  21
thus been tempted to use guarantees rather than loans to reduce their gross borrowing requirement
and to let their fiscal position appear better than it is." 2
7.  Valuation Principles.  In principle, it is possible to calculate the cost of each form of
government  support.  In  the  case  of  a  direct  subsidy,  the  total  value  of  the  subsidy  is
straightforward. When loans are priced below market it is also relatively easy - period by period -
to ascertain the subsidy element contained therein, although it may often be difficult to obtain a
reasonable estimate for the market rate with which to compare the terms of the government loan.
8.  It  is  similarly possible to  estimate the subsidy element contained in  the  guarantee
contained in a financial product like a loan or a straight guarantee.  A loan which assumes full
credit risk may be considered as composed of a risk-free loan minus a full credit guarantee' 3 (see
Merton, 1992);
Risky loan + loan guarantee = default-free loan
or
Risky  loan = default-free  loan  - loan guarantee
9.  The Credit Subsidy Equivalent.  In principle, the value of a full credit guarantee can be
calculated based on the difference between the interest rate of a risk-free loan and that of a normal
market loan. If it is possible to obtain a reasonable value for a market rate, one can compare the fee
charged for a guarantee with the difference in rates of guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans.' 4 To
the extent that the guarantee fee is smaller than that difference, it contains a subsidy element.  The
subsidy elements contained in loans or guarantees may be called the credit subsidy equivalent.  It
can be decomposed into an interest rate subsidy and a default risk coverage.
10.  Clearly, calculation of the credit  subsidy equivalent becomes more  complicated as
government provides support, for which there is no market loan equivalent (e.g., loan or guarantee
with maturities beyond those found in the market) or where return patterns are difficult to assess
(e.g., equity contribution) or where the risks covered are not separately priced in the market, for
example, most types of policy risk guarantees. In those cases, the principles of loan and guarantee
valuation indicated above may, however, still allow the subsidy equivalent to be estimated within
some range.
12  It is unlikely that governments can effectively fool their creditors for any length of time by resorting to off-balance
sheet gimmicks.  Creditors will know  that the  government is  issuing guarantees even if  there is  no  transparent
accounting.  The uncertainty about the government's financial position may actually induce creditors to require a higher
risk premium.  It could also be that creditors are not so worried about the government's guarantee exposure, because -
contrary to the case of loan exposure - the government has not yet parted with cash and might be tempted not to honor
the guarantee if its financial position was weak i.e. it might prefer to default on guarantee commitments rather than on
repayment comritments  to creditors that directly lent to the government. In that case the value of the guarantee would
be reduced.  Governments may be able to fool their various creditors once, but will pay dearly for it later.
13  The formula assumes that the guarantor does not default. If such default were possible, the guarantor's default risk
would need to be evaluated as well.
14  In those cases where there is an adequate history of the incidence of the risk covered by a guarantee it may be
possible to use  option theory to value the guarantee.  Option theory clearly shows how  the value of  a guarantee
increases dramatically with the volatility of the risk factor and with the maturity of the guarantee, because both factors
make it more likely that the guarantee will be called (Mody and Patro, 1996).III. Managing Guarantees  22
11.  To  obtain  a  measure  of  the  subsidy  equivalent that  allows  the  size of  subsidies
contained in different forms of government support to be compared, one needs to discount the
streams of subsidy payments of the different support instruments.  If one uses the government
borrowing rate as the discount rate one obtains a measure of the net budgetary impact of the
subsidy equivalent. Suppose the government had a "subsidy corporation", for example, an import-
export bank or an infrastructure support corporation, which were able to borrow at the government
borrowing rate.  If the subsidy equivalent measure were positive, the corporation would require an
equivalent contribution from the budget to  maintain the net worth  of the corporation.  If the
measure were negative, the corporation could make payments, that is, dividends to the government
(see Box 2).
E~~~~~~~p  ;N
12.  The credit subsidy equivalent provides a measure of the fiscal impact of a guarantee or a
loan. The credit subsidy  equivalent  puts accounting  for guarantees  and loans on an accrual  basis
rather than the cash basis, which still governs most budget systems.
Recommendation (6):  To  enable  governs.ent  to  manage  its  guarantee
exposure it should consider valuing guarantees with their subsidy equivalent and
assessing to  fore  thal th  c  g  nmen at basis, that  e  s, by accru  rather than cash
accounting.
Managing Risk
13.  Valuation of the govemment's exposure needs to be complemented by means to actively
manage the  exposure so that it does not  grow excessively or support the wrong projects. The
following discussion is again concemred  only with managing guarantee exposure. However, similar
principles govem tsu  rateuedto  e  ther forms of financial exposure.
14.  "Marking to Market"  The credit subsidy equivalent provides the goverf  nent  with a
measure to value a guarantee.  The accuracy of this measure depends on how well future default
and interest rate risk" have been assessed. Such assessments are by nature isperfect  and need to be
revised from time to time.  When an assessment shows that the subsidy equivalent has risen the
15 The  subsidy  equivalent  will  change  when  the  govenment  loan  rate  is fixed,  while  market  rates  adjust.III. Managing  Guarantees  23
government should either make an offsetting appropriation from the budget or it (or its guarantee
corporation) may attach collateral that compensate it for the guarantee exposure.
15.  Collateral.  For  example, the government may have guaranteed performance of  a
municipality (e.g. under a water purchase contract from a private water treatment plant), which
receives  tax revenues under the  country's revenue-sharing system.  In  case the government's
guarantee exposure rises, for example, due to a downgrading of the guaranteed agency by a rating
agency, it may ask the beneficiary of the guarantee to pay an increased fee. Failing this  it may
attach money from the tax revenues that are due to the municipality.  Such a system would be
equivalent to the way brokers manage margin loans.' 6 In some countries similar systems exist, for
example, Mexico and India.  In Mexico, the infrastructure bank, BANOBRAS, issues guarantees
which are backed by the tax revenues due to municipalities. However, BANOBRAS only attaches
the tax revenues once the guarantee is called, not when the subsidy equivalent rises. Where an
effective collateral system exists, the cost of the guarantee may be small.' 7
16.  Wherever a government-guarantor  can attach assets in case guarantee exposure rises or
guarantees are called, the guarantee can be provided at low cost, because govermnent is hedged." 8
However, the case above assumes that government will not be obliged to make up the shortfall in
tax revenues for the municipality in other ways -a strong assumption. When political pressures are
likely to force the central government to bail out a company or municipality, it may be better not to
provide guarantee in the first place, because it may simply postpone the day of reckoning and
weaken discipline.
17.  At the supranational level the World Bank guarantee is based on a similar principle (see
Box  3). When  a  World Bank  guarantee is  called the Bank  takes the money back  from  the
government (taxpayers) which counterguarantees  the Bank.  As long as the World Bank's preferred
creditor status remains effective, the cost to the Bank of providing the guarantee is low, that is, the
same as extending a contingent loan.  Other institutions, which lack the World Bank's preferred
creditor status cannot provide a guarantee product at similarly low cost and have to charge much
higher fees, if they are willing to take the risk at all.
18.  Restrictions on the Use of Guarantees.  Another way for the government to manage
exposure is to restrict the uses to which guarantees may be put.  As discussed earlier in this paper, it
may limit the types of risks it is willing to cover and establish principles, which need to be followed
(e.g.,  "provide  guarantees  only  as  part  of  a  sensible reform  package").  It  may  make  an
infrastructure project  guarantee  contingent  on  performance by  the  private  operator.  Other
variations are possible too.
16  When the value of a portfolio of shares funded with margin loans drops, the broker marks the portfolio to market
and asks the investor, who benefits from the margin loan (guaranteed by the broker) to increase her capital contribution.
Otherwise,  the broker  has the right  to possess  some of the portfolio  he holds  as collateral  and sell it to reestablish  the
required capital margin.
17  Just as the borrowing costs of margin lenders are minimal when portfolios can continuously be marked to market
and seized as collateral, when value drops too much (see Merton and Bodie, 1992).
18  If the government-guarantor does not attach assets of the beneficiary it would attach money from the taxpayer to
make the guarantee operation whole.III.  Managing Guarantees  24
'While sovereign  guarantees  can cover  sovereign risks  ..
Guarantees by the sovereign government can deal with risks created by or associated with the
bhavir  of sbereignenties.  For:  emle,  if astate-owned  power  company  is not creditworthy,
the  government  can  guaantee  its  payment  performance  and render a power purchasing  agreement
between  the power  cfompanyand  a private  power  plant  financible. Alternatively,  where  investors  are
worrfied  abot  their ability  toconvert  localcurrency  into foreign  exchange  and to transfer  it abroad  the
government  may help with a guarantee. Or where  a municipality  is the source of rsk, the central
govenmet  cn  inure  Inall  hes  caes,  he  alu  ofinurance  is groundted  in the strength of the
central  g es n p  o  ir  twhich  ses the sovereign  ceiin.
etities  withspri  dtsting  are  neededito  d&alfwti;weak;d  ewithi  Weak  sovereign  risks.
aaWheere  the  t  fsoveign  fitsl  is fnnially  wea or  tsuspected  to  bnrlable,  itsf  own  word  mayf;0
n.  b  enogh  oti  finaneorto  obtSaiitatreasonable ratse. Jn those  cses, the soverign may0
seek a  guarantee  from a  =supra-nationalentity  such as the World Bank  or  a credit-worthy insuranen
better  creditrik,goermetmay  obtan  access  to finance  fat improved  terms that  mnore  than  foffset  the
19.  Fees.  Finally, the government may charge a fee as compensation for the risk it takes
and use them to build reserves against losses under its guarantee program.  The fee may reflect
market conditions for risks, which are similar to those insured by private insurers.  However, in
those cases the rationale for government guarantees may be questionable. For risks that no private
insurer will cover  there will be no easy way to establish a price.  Risks are usually uninsurable in
private markets when there is a great danger of moral hazard (e.g., policy risk of infrastructure
projects). Therefore, the government will in any case wish to ask for some self-insurance by the
beneficiary  - similar  to  a  deductible in  insurance contracts  - so  as  to  reduce  moral  hazard.
Furthermore a fee should be charged that covers the cost of administering the guarantee and that
helps limiting the demand for guarantees from the private sector.  However, care must be taken to
avoid establishing the guarantee fee as "protection  money" (the thief guaranteeing himself).
Recommendation (7):  Government should establish a system to update the
valuation of its guarantee exposure periodically together with mechanisms to
adjust guarantee fees or to seize collateral in case fees are not paid as adjusted.
In addition, the use to which guarantees can be put should be clearly limited and
policies  for  appropriate  guarantee  fees  and  co-insurance  requirements
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